So...the Year of the Loong Begins

* China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao celebrated the Year of the Dragon, or Loong (青龍年），with a seven-day recess. Starting on February 15, people will return to their workplaces amidst economic uncertainties in China and Hong Kong, and an unpredictable cross-Strait relationship following the election of Lai Ching-teh as Taiwan's next president on January 13.

* Over the past week, there were the usual, now almost routine, flight and naval cruiser incursions around Taiwan. There weren't anything out of the ordinary, so most people in Taiwan carried on their Lunary New Year festivities as usual. Many residents journeyed abroad with families and friends, and increasing numbers of visitors from, among other places, Hong Kong and Southeast Asia came to the island because of, among other things, geographic proximity and relatively inexpensive standards of living, giving indications that both inbound and outbound tourism is slowly returning to the pre-COVID levels.

* For the ruling DPP, the president-elect Lai has been busy putting a cabinet together before inauguration on May 20. Though recruiting non-DPP members into government remains a priority, it will largely stay a DPP-dominated administration with few political appointees from other parties to represent an "inclusive governing coalition."

* Across the Strait, Beijing already has a plateful of pressing issues with long-term implications. Beginning with a sluggish economy and rising unemployment, especially among those 40 and under, economic goal-setting, maybe for the first time, has more unknowns than answers this time around. With the US-China economic competition remaining intense, few in the government are certain if any of the stimulus measures, once implemented, would lead to the desired results. In addition, the sagging stock markets have undermined the public's confidence in the ruling CCP's abilities to address economic matters. That's never a good sign in a command economy.

* What makes cross-Strait relations tricky, and potentially dangerous, this year is the number of unknowns and unpredictables. While it's not a priority for the CCP to "resolve" the Taiwan issue now, president-elect Lai's past independence-leaning rhetorics have put Beijing's policy makers on the edge of their seats. Furthermore, since there is no channels of communication between Beijing and Taipei, any misinterpretation of the other's words and deeds runs the risks of a minor incident spiraling out of control. Though that's been a priority for Washington and neighboring countries like Japan and South Korea, it does not appear imminent that the current impasse will have a breakthrough this year. Therein lies the risks of miscalculation.

 Bracing for a New Political Landscape...

* The Legislative Yuan (LY) will convene on February 20, with a first KMT-backed speaker and vice speaker tandem in eight years. In addition, smaller parties like the People First Party (PFP) and New Power Party (NPP) failed to win any seat to form a caucus. Therefore, it's now a three-party affair between the KMT, DPP, and TPP in the coming four years.

* There are indications that the TPP plans to utilize its eight seats to the fullest and will work with both the KMT and DPP on legislations that fit its party's interests. The most important task for the TPP is to develop its grassroots organization around Taiwan, continue its strong hold on voters below 40, and avoid being labeled as a "small green" or "small blue" party. In other words, if the TPP gets too close with either the KMT or DPP, it's easy to blur the party lines and makes a "political merger" with either inevitable. Since TPP Chairman Ke Wen-je has presidential aspirations for 2028, party independence is indispensable to remain politically viable.

* The KMT and the DPP, on the other hand, will explore ways to work together when the legislative agenda fits their respective party interests. They will compete, contend, and collaborate in the next four years. No one knows how the inter-party relations will look, but violence will not be commonplace. That's a welcome change from Taiwan's LY when little room for rational debate remained available. 

 And The TPP Will Vote For...

* Taiwan's Legislative Yuan (LY) will begin a new session and elect a speaker and a vice speaker at the same time. Since neither the KMT nor the DPP holds an outright majority, the eight seats of the TPP thus become critical. On the eve of the February 1 election, the TPP made it clear that it will nominate its own candidate, Huang Shan-shan, to contest the speakership.

* Suppose all 113 LY members vote along party lines, it is impossible to elect Huang with TPP's eight seats. Therefore, if no party candidate wins a majority in the first round of voting, the second round, or the run-off, becomes a competition between KMT's Han Kuo-yu and DPP's Yu Si-kuan. Barring any surprises, KMT's Han will win the speakership in the LY.

* Since many local media outlets had already predicted the declared strategy above would serve the TPP's interests best, many believe this strategy would help the TPP win a seat as LY committee convener, capturing leverage over priority of draft bills to be review by the said committee, if a negotiated agreement can be reached with either KMT or DPP. It would be more politically significant for a young political party just established in 2019.

* Depending on the bill, one can expect the TPP to work with both KMT and DPP at different times. It is undoubtedly the best strategy for a small party looking to grow and expand in the coming years. In addition to the relentless media pursuit and coverage during the last couple of weeks, TPP has secured its position as an indispensable player in Taiwan's young democracy. The key is not to over-play its minority niche. This time, the TPP has come close, but not overstepping that line.

* In essence, TPP's future is in its own hands. Less politicking and more on legislative performance would be a good place to start. How cohesive the party can stay together, particularly the eight seats in the LY, would be one of the first challenges this young party faces. 

 The Key Minority

* With eight seats in Taiwan's 113-seat Legislative Yuan (LY), the Taiwan People's Party (TPP) has positioned itself as a relevant, sometimes indispensable, player to get anything passed in the next four years. In fact, it is abundantly evident in the upcoming intra-LY election for the speaker and the vice speaker on February 1, 2024.

* Since neither the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) nor the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) captured an outright majority over the 57-seat threshold, both need to win the support of the TPP in key votes to attain a majority. Therefore, in the speaker election on February 1, the nominees from both the DPP and the KMT had visited the TPP legislative caucus' office in recent days and, in turn, accepted, at least in principle, the reform package proposed by the TPP.

* It is rare for any small party to command the attention, and respect, of the two major parties in Taiwan's young democracy, but in the fifth year of its existence, the TPP has achieved the level of influence and relevance that no one could ignore. Unless it commits a major strategic misstep in the next four years, it is likely that Taiwan's 2028 presidential election will again be a tripartite affair between the DPP, KMT, and TPP. The next mayoral election in November 2026 would be a major test of TPP's grassroots support, in addition to its already formidable presence over the Internet, especially for those 40 and under.

 A Not-So-Minor Minority President?

* DPP's William Lai won the January 13 presidential election with a little more than 40% (40.05% to be exact) of the popular votes. Though the outcome wasn't much of a surprise, Lai's vote total was 17% lower than what Tsai Ing-wen garnered in 2020. Most young voters--those 40 and under--preferred former Taipei Mayor Ke Wen-je over Lai, and there is no indication that things will change anytime soon.

* Kuomintang's Hou You-yi, on the other hand, returned to being the mayor of New Taipei City following the disappointing results. Though many factors were responsible for Hou's defeat, his lack of personal charisma and experience on national issues, just to name a few, were clearly flaws that Hou was never able to recover. At the same time, he's doing his best to stave-off a grassroots-initiated recall campaign and avoid suffering the same fate as former Kaohsiung Mayor Han Kuo-yu following the 2020 campaign.

* On the other hand, the KMT became the largest party, at 52 seats, in the Legislative Yuan (LY). With two friendly independent allies, the KMT now effectively wields 54 votes in the 113-seat body. The DPP only retained 51 seats, and the Taiwan People's Party (TPP) holds a key minority position with 8 seats.

* The new makeup of the LY could hamper the functioning of the incoming DPP administration. The TPP already made it clear that it intends to utilize its eight seats on legislations deemed critical to its survival and relevance. But there has been so much bad blood between the DPP and TPP, it's unlikely the two two can work closely together and consistently. The same can be said between the KMT and the TPP. Therefore, with LY being unpredictable in the next four years, it remains unclear that how much, and how inclusive, the Lai administration can implement policies that it aims to deliver following a hard-fought campaign.