And The TPP Will Vote For...

* Taiwan's Legislative Yuan (LY) will begin a new session and elect a speaker and a vice speaker at the same time. Since neither the KMT nor the DPP holds an outright majority, the eight seats of the TPP thus become critical. On the eve of the February 1 election, the TPP made it clear that it will nominate its own candidate, Huang Shan-shan, to contest the speakership.

* Suppose all 113 LY members vote along party lines, it is impossible to elect Huang with TPP's eight seats. Therefore, if no party candidate wins a majority in the first round of voting, the second round, or the run-off, becomes a competition between KMT's Han Kuo-yu and DPP's Yu Si-kuan. Barring any surprises, KMT's Han will win the speakership in the LY.

* Since many local media outlets had already predicted the declared strategy above would serve the TPP's interests best, many believe this strategy would help the TPP win a seat as LY committee convener, capturing leverage over priority of draft bills to be review by the said committee, if a negotiated agreement can be reached with either KMT or DPP. It would be more politically significant for a young political party just established in 2019.

* Depending on the bill, one can expect the TPP to work with both KMT and DPP at different times. It is undoubtedly the best strategy for a small party looking to grow and expand in the coming years. In addition to the relentless media pursuit and coverage during the last couple of weeks, TPP has secured its position as an indispensable player in Taiwan's young democracy. The key is not to over-play its minority niche. This time, the TPP has come close, but not overstepping that line.

* In essence, TPP's future is in its own hands. Less politicking and more on legislative performance would be a good place to start. How cohesive the party can stay together, particularly the eight seats in the LY, would be one of the first challenges this young party faces. 

 The Key Minority

* With eight seats in Taiwan's 113-seat Legislative Yuan (LY), the Taiwan People's Party (TPP) has positioned itself as a relevant, sometimes indispensable, player to get anything passed in the next four years. In fact, it is abundantly evident in the upcoming intra-LY election for the speaker and the vice speaker on February 1, 2024.

* Since neither the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) nor the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) captured an outright majority over the 57-seat threshold, both need to win the support of the TPP in key votes to attain a majority. Therefore, in the speaker election on February 1, the nominees from both the DPP and the KMT had visited the TPP legislative caucus' office in recent days and, in turn, accepted, at least in principle, the reform package proposed by the TPP.

* It is rare for any small party to command the attention, and respect, of the two major parties in Taiwan's young democracy, but in the fifth year of its existence, the TPP has achieved the level of influence and relevance that no one could ignore. Unless it commits a major strategic misstep in the next four years, it is likely that Taiwan's 2028 presidential election will again be a tripartite affair between the DPP, KMT, and TPP. The next mayoral election in November 2026 would be a major test of TPP's grassroots support, in addition to its already formidable presence over the Internet, especially for those 40 and under.

 A Not-So-Minor Minority President?

* DPP's William Lai won the January 13 presidential election with a little more than 40% (40.05% to be exact) of the popular votes. Though the outcome wasn't much of a surprise, Lai's vote total was 17% lower than what Tsai Ing-wen garnered in 2020. Most young voters--those 40 and under--preferred former Taipei Mayor Ke Wen-je over Lai, and there is no indication that things will change anytime soon.

* Kuomintang's Hou You-yi, on the other hand, returned to being the mayor of New Taipei City following the disappointing results. Though many factors were responsible for Hou's defeat, his lack of personal charisma and experience on national issues, just to name a few, were clearly flaws that Hou was never able to recover. At the same time, he's doing his best to stave-off a grassroots-initiated recall campaign and avoid suffering the same fate as former Kaohsiung Mayor Han Kuo-yu following the 2020 campaign.

* On the other hand, the KMT became the largest party, at 52 seats, in the Legislative Yuan (LY). With two friendly independent allies, the KMT now effectively wields 54 votes in the 113-seat body. The DPP only retained 51 seats, and the Taiwan People's Party (TPP) holds a key minority position with 8 seats.

* The new makeup of the LY could hamper the functioning of the incoming DPP administration. The TPP already made it clear that it intends to utilize its eight seats on legislations deemed critical to its survival and relevance. But there has been so much bad blood between the DPP and TPP, it's unlikely the two two can work closely together and consistently. The same can be said between the KMT and the TPP. Therefore, with LY being unpredictable in the next four years, it remains unclear that how much, and how inclusive, the Lai administration can implement policies that it aims to deliver following a hard-fought campaign.

 The Final Fifty-Yard Dash

* After months of intense campaigning, Taiwan's 2024 presidential race comes down to the final ten days. The polls will open from 8am to 4pm on Saturday, January 13, 2024. Barring something unforeseen, the results should be available no later than 8pm.

* Since no opinion poll will be made public in the final ten days, the last available numbers still showed DPP's William Lai has a narrowing lead of 2-4 percent over KMT's Hou You-yi, with Taiwan People's Party Chairman Ke Wen-je a distant third. Since the difference between Lai and Hou is within the margin of error, it's essentially a toss-up between the two dominant parties of DPP and KMT, with the voter turnout rate (anything higher 70% would be considered a boost for Hou) and any last-minute scandal (which has to directly implicate the candidate ) the remaining variables that could potentially upset the outcome.

* The election results will have, of course, far reaching consequences on cross-Strait relations and on US-China ties in the next four years, at least. While no one can predict with any certainty on China-Taiwan relations in the coming years, nobody should underestimate Beijing's resolve to reunify with Taiwan, by force if necessary, should the latter overstepping the "red lines" that Beijing has long deemed provocative, e.g. dejure independence and external interference. That scenario is far more likely if the DPP retains power and pursue measures that, in Beijing's eyes, made peaceful unification impossible.

* The impact on the global economy would be devastating should a military conflict breaks out in the Taiwan Strait. Nobody wants to see that happening, and it's not imminent. It is, however, fair to say that no matter who the victor is on January 13, the room for policy and behavioral interpretation is limited if a foundation of trust is not put in place quickly across the Taiwan Strait. It's not going to be easy, especially after the suspension of dialogue since 2016. The four-month transfer of power period, until May 20, presents a particularly difficult challenge for all parties in the US-China-Taiwan trilateral context.